Malicious Adversary
A malicious adversary may deviate from the protocol, submit malformed inputs, manipulate outputs, or selectively abort.
Practical Example
A participant in federated learning sends poisoned updates while secure aggregation makes individual update inspection difficult.
Good Fit
Use this model when parties have competing incentives, financial stakes, or weak governance.
PET Implications
Prefer malicious-secure protocols, input validation, robust aggregation, audit logs, rate limits, and incident response plans.
Common Gap
Many prototypes claim privacy against curious parties while product teams assume protection against malicious ones.
What Changes In The Design
| Design area | Honest-but-curious design | Malicious-adversary review |
|---|---|---|
| Inputs | Well-formed inputs are assumed | Validate format, range, provenance, and replay behavior |
| Participants | Identity is mostly administrative | Authenticate, rate-limit, suspend, and audit participants |
| Computation | Protocol privacy is the main concern | Add robustness, malicious security, or verifiable execution |
| Failure handling | Retry failed runs | Treat aborts, dropouts, and timing as possible signals |
| Operations | Debugging can inspect more artifacts | Debugging paths must not bypass privacy controls |