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Malicious Adversary

A malicious adversary may deviate from the protocol, submit malformed inputs, manipulate outputs, or selectively abort.

Practical Example

A participant in federated learning sends poisoned updates while secure aggregation makes individual update inspection difficult.

Good Fit

Use this model when parties have competing incentives, financial stakes, or weak governance.

PET Implications

Prefer malicious-secure protocols, input validation, robust aggregation, audit logs, rate limits, and incident response plans.

Common Gap

Many prototypes claim privacy against curious parties while product teams assume protection against malicious ones.

What Changes In The Design

Design area Honest-but-curious design Malicious-adversary review
Inputs Well-formed inputs are assumed Validate format, range, provenance, and replay behavior
Participants Identity is mostly administrative Authenticate, rate-limit, suspend, and audit participants
Computation Protocol privacy is the main concern Add robustness, malicious security, or verifiable execution
Failure handling Retry failed runs Treat aborts, dropouts, and timing as possible signals
Operations Debugging can inspect more artifacts Debugging paths must not bypass privacy controls